Major-General Baden-Powell’s official report on the Siege of Mafeking.
Editor’s Note:

The reader is reminded that these texts have been written a long time ago. Consequently, they may use some terms or use expressions which were current at the time, regardless of what we may think of them at the beginning of the 21st century. For reasons of historical accuracy they have been preserved in their original form.

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SOUTH AFRICAN DESPATCHES.

War Office, February 8, 1901.

The following Despatches and Enclosures have been received from Lord Roberts, K.G., V.C., Commander-in-Chief, South Africa:—

No. 13.
From Field Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State for War.

Army Head-quarters, South Africa.
My Lord,

Pretoria, 21st June, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to submit for your Lordship’s consideration a despatch, dated 18th May, 1900, with annexures and a letter dated 6th June, 1900, from Major-General R. S. S. Baden-Powell, describing the siege of Mafeking which lasted from the 18th October, 1899, to the 17th May, 1900, and bringing to notice the Officers and men, as well as the civilians and ladies, who rendered good service during the above period.

2. I feel assured that Her Majesty’s Government will agree with me in thinking that the utmost credit is due to Major-General Baden-Powell for his promptness in raising two regiments of Mounted Infantry in Rhodesia, and for the resolution, judgment, and resource which he displayed throughout the long and trying investment of Mafeking by the Boer forces. The distinction which Major-General Baden-Powell has earned must be shared by his gallant soldiers. No episode in the present war seems more praiseworthy than the prolonged defence of this town by a British garrison, consisting almost entirely of Her Majesty’s Colonial forces, inferior in numbers and greatly inferior in artillery.
lory to the enemy, cut off from communication with Cape Colony, and with the hope of relief repeatedly deferred until the supplies of food were nearly exhausted.

3. Inspired by their Commander’s example, the defenders of Mafeking maintained a never-failing confidence and cheerfulness, which conducted most materially to the successful issue; they made light of the hardships to which they were exposed; and they withstood the enemy’s attacks with an audacity which so disheartened their opponents that, except on one occasion, namely, on 12th May, no serious attempt was made to capture the place by assault. This attempt was repulsed in a manner which showed that the determination and fighting qualities of the garrison remained unimpaired to the last.

4. In recording my high appreciation of the conduct of all ranks during this memorable siege, I desire cordially to support Major-General Baden-Powell’s recommendations on behalf of those serving under his orders, and the civilians and others who co-operated with him in the maintenance of order, and in the care of the sick and wounded.

I have, &c.,

ROBERTS, Field-Marshal, Commanding-in-Chief South Africa.

From Major-General Baden-Powell, Commanding at Mafeking, to the Chief Staff Officer to Lord Roberts;

Mafeking.

My Lord, 18th May, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith my report on the siege of Mafeking by the Boers, from 13th October, 1899, to 17th May, 1900, for the information of his Excellency the Field-Marshal Commanding in South Africa.

I have, &c.,

R. S. S. BADEN-POWELL, Major-General.

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I arrived in the beginning of August in Rhodesia, with orders—

1. To raise two regiments of Mounted Infantry.
2. In the event of war, to organize the defence of the Rhodesia and Bechuanaland frontiers.
3. As far as possible, to keep forces of the enemy occupied in this direction away from their own main forces.

I had the two regiments raised, equipped, supplied, and ready for service by the end of September.

As war became imminent, I saw that my force would be too weak to effect much if scattered along the whole border (500 miles), unless it were reinforced with some men and good guns. I reported this, but as none were available I decided to concentrate my two columns at Bulawayo and Mafeking respectively, as being the desirable points to hold.

Of the two, Mafeking seemed the more important for many reasons, strategical and political—

1. Because it is the outpost for Kimberley and Cape Colony.
2. Also, equally, for the—Protectorate an
3. It threatens the weak flank of the Transvaal.
4. It is the head-centre of the large native districts of the north-west, with their 200,000 inhabitants.
5. It contains important railway stocks and workshops.
6. Also large food and forage supplies.

Therefore I left the northern column in charge of Colonel Plumer, and went myself to Mafeking, and organized its defence.

Mafeking.

Mafeking is an open town, 1,000 yards square, in open undulating country, on the north bank of the Molopo stream. Eight miles from the Transvaal border. White population about 1,000.

The native Stadt lies 4 mile south-west, and contains 6,000 inhabitants.

Defence Force.

700 whites, of whom 20 were Imperial Army, remainder Protectorate Regiment, British South Africa Police, Cape Police, and Bechuanaland Rifles (Volunteers). These were used to man the forts and outworks.

300 able-bodied townsmen enrolled as town guard. Employed to garrison the town itself.

300 natives enrolled as cattle guards, watchmen, police, &c.

Half the defenders were armed with L.M. rifle, half with M.H. rifles, with 600 rounds per rifle.

Total Numbers.
White men, 1,074; white women, 232; white children, 405; natives, 7,500.

Our armament consisted of—

Four 7-pounder M.L. guns, one 1-pounder Hotchkiss, one 2-inch Nordenfelt—all old.

Seven 303 Maxim.

To this armament we afterwards added—

One 6-pounder M.L. old ship’s gun, one 16-pounder M.L. howitzer (made in my own shops).

I had two armoured engines promised from Kimberley. I had armoured trucks made at Bulawayo and Mafeking. One engine arrived, the other was cut off en route by the enemy and captured at Kraapian.

The Siege.

On the 13th October the siege began. General Cronje with an army of 8,000 Boers and 10 guns, most of them of modern pattern and power, surrounded the place.

On the approach of the enemy we sallied out and, in a sharp little engagement, dealt them a severe blow, by which they lost 53 killed and many more wounded, and which had a lasting moral effect.

During the first phase of the siege, October and November, General Cronje made various attempts to take the place. These attacks we beat off without difficulty in every case, and responded by sorties, varying their nature every time as far as possible, and making them so sudden and so quickly withdrawn as not to give the enemy’s supports time to come up and reinforce the attack. Of these “kicks” we delivered—half-a-dozen, on 14th, 17th, 20th, 25th, 27th, 31st October, and 7th November (the Boers quote 14, but they include demonstrations and shelling of dummy forts, guns, and armoured trucks, &c., which we put up to draw their fire).

The enemy’s losses in this period were very heavy as compared with ours—
Boers' losses—287 killed, 800 wounded.*
Our losses—35 killed, 101 wounded, 27 missing.

Cronje having lost a month of valuable time at Mafeking, now gave up the idea of taking the place by storm, and moved off south for Kimberley with 4,000 men and 6 guns (leaving General Seymour with the remainder, viz., 3,000 to 4,000 men and six guns, including a 94-pounder siege gun) to invest us.

Seeing then that we could not be relieved for many weeks, if not months, I took over into our own management all details such as hospital, municipality, police, treasury, post and telegraph, railway, native affairs, water supply, etc., and everything was arranged for drawing in our horns if necessary. However, in the event we were able to maintain our original position, and even further to extend it as became necessary.

The next phase lasted 3 months, November to January, during which Snyman pushed his works and trenches nearer to the place.

He also drew a cordon of natives around the whole. His artillery kept up a continual bombardment on the town.

On our part, during January, February, and March, we pushed out counter-works, and gradually gained point after point of ground till we obtained grazing for our live stock, and finally (after a hard tussel in the "Brickfields," in which we had counter-trenching up to within 70 yards of the enemy's works), we drove them back at all points out of range for rifle fire of the town.

During this period, owing to the careful and systematic sharp-shooting of our men, the enemy's losses continued to be largely in excess of our own. 40 per month killed was admitted by the Boer medical officer.

In April the enemy withdrew the siege gun, and contented themselves with investing us at a distance, and shelling our cattle in the hope of starving us into submission.

On the 12th May the enemy made a bold attack on our pickets, and succeeded in getting into the Stadt with their storming party, but we beat back their supports and surrounded the remainder, inflicting on them a loss of 70 killed and wounded, and 108 prisoners, including Eloff their commandant (grandson of President Kruger).

In the meantime, Colonel Plumer had near Tuli prevented a force of Boers from invading Matabeleland from the south. After their retreat the rising of the river made him to defend the railway and the Protecorate border (which were already being held by a small force organized from Bulawayo by Colonel Nicholson).

Colonel Plumer accordingly pushed down the line, repairing it to within 40 miles of Mafeking, and pushing back the enemy who had been holding it. He then established himself in a good position 35 miles north-west of us, where he was in touch by means of runners and pigeons, was able to afford refuge to our nurses escaping out, and he was also able to put a stop to enemy's depredations and to give security to the natives throughout the Protectorate, his force being too small to effect more till reinforced. His presence enabled us to get rid of nearly 2,000 native women and children, which materially relieved the strain on our food supply.

Early in May, he was reinforced by Canadian Artillery and Queensland Infantry, &c., and on 15th he joined hands with a relief column from the south under Colonel Mahon.

And, on the 17th May, the relief of Mafeking was successfully effected by the combined columns, after a siege of 215 days.

One of the most noticeable features of the long and trying siege has been the loyalty, patience, and good feeling which have prevailed throughout the community, civil, military, and native. The steadfastness and gallantry of the troops in action, and their cheerful acceptance of hardships, are beyond praise.

The ladies, and especially those who acted as nurses in the hospitals, displayed the greatest patience and fortitude.

Résumé of Points gained by the Rhodesian Frontier Force.

(October, 1899, to May, 1900).
I.—At Mafeking.
1. A force of 8,000 Boers and 10 guns was contained at the first outbreak of war, and prevented from either combining with the Tuli column, and invading Rhodesia, or joining the forces against Kimberley. Cronje's command was thus held here for a month.
2. From 3,000 to 3,000 Boers and eight guns (including a 94-pounder) were kept employed here for four months.
3. The enemy expended considerably over 100 tons of ammunition, and lost over 1,000 men killed and wounded, and had four guns disabled and one captured.
4. Large stores of food and forage, and general stocks, were prevented from falling into the enemy's hands.
5. Valuable railway plant, including 18 locomotives, rolling stock, shops, coal, &c., were saved.
6. Refuge was given to a large number of British from the Transvaal.
7. Most of the local neighbouring tribes, and all those of the protectorate and South Matebeleland, remained loyal, which they could not have continued to do had Mafeking fallen and they been at the mercy of the Boers.
8. Loss of prestige to Cronje's force, who had apparently expected to take possession at once on first arrival, and had had proclamation printed annexing the district to the South African Republic.

II.—The Rhodesian Column.

During the same period the northern portion of my force under Colonel Plumer (in spite of its small numbers and the exceptionally difficult country and trying climate in which it was operating) succeeded—
1. In holding and sending back the enemy in their attempt to invade Rhodesia, via Tuli.
2. In holding the Bulawayo railway for some 200 miles south of the Rhodesian border.
3. In giving direct support and protection to the natives in Khamas and Linchwe's domains, and Bathoen's and the Protectorate generally when threatened by the enemy.
4. In pushing down and repairing the railway in the face of the enemy to within 40 miles
of Mafeking, and there establishing a place of security for our natives escaping from Mafeking, and collecting supplies ready to effect our relief of Mafeking on arrival of reinforcements.

III.—The Palapye Column.

A small column organised by Colonel Nicholson from Bulawayo, with armoured trains, &c., held Mangwe, Palapye, Mochudi, &c., on the railway until Plumer’s column was available for the duty.

The whole of the frontier force, north and south columns combined, numbered under 1,700, while the Boers during the early part of the campaign had between 9,000 and 10,000 out on their northern and north-western border. Country operated over, between Mafeking and Tuli, 450 miles in length.

II.—Minor Points connected with the Siege.

(Alphabetically arranged.)


Our so-called artillery should of course have been entirely outclassed by the modern high-velocity guns of the enemy, but in practice they managed to hold their own in spite of their using powder, shells, and fuzes all made in our own shops. The artillery and also the ordnance shops under management of Mr. Howat, postmaster, were connected up with head-quarters, and his staff. I was thus able to receive reports and issue orders for all parts of the defence instantaneously.

No. 27282.

Monday, February 8, 1901.

Summary Jurisdiction—

Directly amenable to military law, a Court of Summary Jurisdiction—

Members:

Resident Commissioner.

Resident Magistrate.

Town Commandant.

Officer Commanding Protectorate Regiment.

Chief Staff Officer.

At first it was a little difficult to make the civilians appreciate the restrictions of martial law, and, as times grew more critical, there came a tendency to spread rumours and to grumble, this had to be stopped. I also published some explanatory remarks and advice on the working of martial law, &c., and these steps had a most marked effect, obedience to orders and a good spirit thenceforward prevailed in the garrison.

Compensation.

From the commencement of the siege careful record was kept of all shell-fire damage to property, and claims of owners considered and assessed. Total assessed, $16,462.10s.2d. No promise was held out that Government would grant compensation, the proceedings were merely intended to assist the commission should one afterwards be assembled, and to protect Government against exorbitant claims.

A record was also made of losses suffered by refugees, in property, livestock, &c.

All livestock killed or wounded by shell fire was bought at a fair price and utilized for food, so that the owners have no claims on this head, at the same time the value of the animals is in many cases not represented by cash, and it would be far more satisfactory to the owners if they could be repaid in kind. This is a point which I venture to suggest be taken into consideration when dealing with the Boers after the war; a substantial fine in cattle would
touch them heavily without leaving them destitute, and the bestowal of such cattle on deserving and looted loyalists would give great satisfaction and be far more acceptable to them, and less expensive to Government, than grants of money.

Correspondents.
(Under Lieutenand to Hon. A. Hanbury-Tracy as Press Censor).

These gentlemen gave a certain amount of trouble at first, as for the most part they were more reporters than correspondents. Further reforms in the matter of correspondents in the field are very desirable. The enemy derived a great deal of information as to our circumstances from the newspapers, not only the local ones, but also from the Colonial and English papers, in spite of a strict censorship on our part.

Defence Accoounts.
(Under Captain Greener, British South Africa Police).

Expenditure during the siege.
To labour, 13,024£.
To pay, local corps and trench allowance 20,777£.
To pay, clerical and civil staff, 5,542£.
To footstuffs, grain, rations, &c., 36,076£.
To material, clothing, equipment, &c., 10,901£.
To hospital staff, comforts, &c., 5,411£.
To local transport, 890£.
Total, 96,323£.
To payments other than defence, viz., frontier forces, special pay, &c., 92,729£.
Total, 123,251£.

Receipts.
By footstuffs, and grain sales, 5,184£.
By soup kitchens, 3,242£.
By sales of Government property, 442£.
By local post office, 238£.
By dog tax, 67£.
By fines, 127£.
Total, 7,53£.
Weekly average expenditure in pay, 1,550£.
Average receipts for rations, 263£.
Soup, 600£.
Total, 1,225£.

Defence Works.
(Under direction of Major Vyvyan, for town and East Front; Major Godley, West Front.)

Scheme.—General scheme at first was to secure the town and Stadt by direct fire, laying mines, fortifying outposts, &c. Then to push out advanced trenches to drive back those of the enemy, and finally to establish a girdle of outlying forts.

The scheme included the provision of bomb-proofs and extensive covered ways, gun emplacements, drainage, &c. 50 works were made, and about 64 miles of trenches.

The perimeter of the works at first was approximately 7 miles, latterly it extended to a little over 10 miles.

Nature.—Generally semicircular redans, but no two works were similar in trace, they varied according to position, ground, &c. At first dog out and kept very low, latterly, owing to difficulties of drainage, long grass, inaccuracy of enemy's shell fire, &c., they were made more upstanding. Head cover was found to be essential. When trenches were near, steel loopholes had to be used, the ordinary sandbag and wooden ones being too good a target to the enemy.

Huts.—A good form of portable iron and wood hut was devised, and used for housing the garrisons of the forts.

Enemy's Artillery.—Fighting, Treachery, Field Works.

Artillery.—Guns employed—
1—94-pr. Creusot, 15-cm., 20-lb. charge.
2—7-pr. (Jameson's).
2—5-pr. Armstrong's B.L.
1—12-pr. B.L.
1—9-pr. Krupp, B.L.
1—3-pr. maxims, high velocity.
2—1-pr. maxims.
Total, 11 guns.
The 94-pr. fired 1,497 rounds, and the artillery altogether fired 2,000 rounds during the siege.

The damage done was very small, partly owing to the open nature of the town and lowness of our forts, but more especially on account of the want of intelligent directing of the fire.

Fighting.—The enemy's attacks invariably failed from want of discipline and pluck on the part of the men.

In the attack on Cannon Kopje they got within 30 yards of us, and even started digging shelter trenches, but when the men began to fall the rest retreated promptly.

The night attack on the Stadt, on 12th May, was boldly led by Bluff and a number of foreigners, and had their supports come on with equal pluck, we should have had a hard task to drive them out, but as it was the supports were easily beaten off and the storming party surrounded.

Treachery.—The enemy fired on numerous occasions on our hospital, convent, and women's laager, although these were conspicuously marked with Red Cross flags, stood in isolated positions, and had been fully pointed out by me to the Boer Generals.

The women's laager was deliberately shelled in particular on 24th and 30th October, 27th January, and 11th April.

The Red Cross flag was used to cover artillery taking up position on 24th, 30th, and 31st October.

Convent deliberately shelled, 16th October, 3rd and 8th November.

Our white flag, returning from a conference with the enemy, was deliberately volleyed, 17th January.

Field works.—The enemy's trenches were of a very good design, and made in well-selected positions, the typical trench or fort consisted of a chain of small chambers 10 feet square, partly excavated, partly built up with sandbags, having stout walls, loopholed to front and rear, the whole roofed in with corrugated iron and railway rails. Command, about 3 feet.

Finance.
(Under Captain Greener, Chief Paymaster.)

I ordered all Government accounts to be kept settled up to date, so as to leave as little as possible for subsequent settlement; much work and confusion has thereby been saved.

The accounts were well kept by Captain Greener and his staff. An examiner of accounts was appointed to check accounts before payment, and also an auditor for the larger amounts.

Cash in bank amounted to 12,000£, of which only 650£. was in silver. Cash soon became scarce, because the public, especially the natives and Indian traders, concealed all the cash they could get, in anticipation of the place being taken by the enemy.

Paper money thus became necessary, and I
issued coupons for 1s., 2s., and 3s. Ultimately gold also became scarce, and 11 notes were printed in cyanotype and issued; but they never got into real circulation, as people kept them as curios to the extent of 7000. 10s. coupons were issued with satisfactory result.

For the convenience of the men, and to get cash from the public, a "Garrison Savings Bank" was opened. Deposits amounted to £8,900.

Total Government expenditure to end of May, £142,660.

Total Government receipts to end of May, £11,625.

Food Supply.

(Under Captain Ryan.)

Early in the siege, I took over all merchant stocks and put everybody on rations.

Beginning on the usual scale, I gradually reduced it to the lowest that would allow of the men being fit for duty. During the latter part of the siege no exras of any kind were obtainable. All lived strictly on the following scale:

- Meat, at first, 1 lb.; latterly, 2 to 1 lb.
- Bread, at first, 1 lb.; latterly, 5 oz.
- Vegetables, at first, 1 lb.; latterly, 6 oz.
- Coffee, at first, 4 oz.; latterly, 4 oz.
- Salt, at first, 2 oz.; latterly, ½ oz.
- Sugar, at first, 2 oz.
- Tea, at first, 2 oz.
- Sowens, latterly, 1 quart.

We had a large stock of meat, both live and tinned.

For livestock, we had to open up wide extent of grazing ground. We ate the fresh meat first in order to avoid loss from enemy’s fire, failure of grass and water, lung sickness, etc.

The tinned meat we stored in bombproof chambers, and kept as reserve.

During the last two months we were on horseflesh three days a week.

Our stocks of meal were comparatively small, but we had a large supply of forage oats. These we ground into flour, and fermented the residue into sowens (a form of porridge) and the remaining husks went as forage to the horses.

Fresh vegetables were largely grown within the defences, and for a greater part of the siege formed a regular portion of the ration.

The cost of feeding the troops was 1s. 3d. per ragi, or, with fresh vegetables, 1s. 6d.; about 3d. below the contract price in peace. Civilians paid 2s., and women in the laager Is. 6d.

All liquor was taken over and issued in “tots” to the troops on wet nights, and I think saved much sickness.

Natives.—For the natives, we established four soup kitchens at which horse stew was sold daily, and five sowen kitchens. Natives were all registered, to prevent fraud, and bought rations at 1 quart per adult, and 1 pint per child, at 3d. per pint.

Defence watchmen, workmen, police, &c., and certified destitute persons were given free rations. The kitchens so managed paid their own expenses.

They were under Captain Wilson, A.D.C., with Mr. Myers as cash taken and inspector.

Fuel.

Coal.—300 tons available at railway store, was used for armoured train, ordnance foundry, pumping station, flour mills, forage factory, &c.

Wood.—25,000 lb. weekly for bakery, soap, and oat-sowen kitchens, cooking, &c. Procured from roofs of huts in the Stadt, old wagons, lopped trees, fencing, &c.

Petroleum.—Asbestos stove made, but was not a success.

Patent fuel.—Cow dung and coal dust, mixed in equal parts and baked, produced 20 tons good fuel.

Hospital.

(Under Major Anderson, Royal Army Medical Corps, as Principal Medical Officer.)

Staff—

Dr. W. Hayes (acted as Principal Medical Officer during the first part of the siege).

Surgeon-Major Holmden, British South Africa Police.

Dr. T. Hayes, District Surgeon.

Dr. Elmes. Garrison.

Protectionate Regiment.

Lieutenant-Colonel Hore, Commander.—21 Officers, 448 men.

British South Africa Police.

Lieutenant-Colonel Walford, Commander.—10 Officers, 81 men.

Cape Police, Division 1.

Inspector Marsh, Commander.—2 Officers, 45 men.

Cape Police, Division 2.

Inspector Browne, Commander.—2 Officers, 54 men.

Bechuanaland Rifles.

Captain Cowan, Commander.—4 Officers, 77 men.

Deduct missing at Lobatsi.—1 Officer, 26 men.

Total drilled men.—38 Officers, 679 men.

Total garrison.—44 Officers, 975 men.

From the above Town Guard was formed the Railway Division, 2 Officers, 20 men, under (local) Captain More.

The following commanded sections of the defence:

Western defences, Major Godley.

Stadt and south-western forts, Captain Marsh.

Cannon Kopje and south front, Colonel Walford.

South-eastern works (brickfields), Inspector Marsh, at first, Inspector Browne, latterly.

North-east works, Captain Cowan.

Town, Colonel Vyvyan, at first, Major Goodlad-Adams, latterly.

Head-quarters Staff—

Chief Staff Officer—Lord E. Cecil.

Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General (B)—Captain Ryan.

Intelligence Officer—Lieutenant Hon. Hanbury-Tracy.

Aide-de-Camp—Captain Wilson.

Commanding Royal Artillery.—Major Panzer.

Commanding Royal Engineer.—Colonel Vyrwy.

Hospital.

(Under Major Anderson, Royal Army Medical Corps, as Principal Medical Officer.)

Staff—

Dr. W. Hayes (acted as Principal Medical Officer during the first part of the siege).

Surgeon-Major Holmden, British South Africa Police.

Dr. T. Hayes, District Surgeon.

Dr. Elmes.

Victoria Hospital (base hospital).—Nursing Staff: Miss Hill (Matron) and three nurses, assisted by four volunteer nurses; also by Mother Teresa and six sisters.
Convalescent hospital.—At convent, Lady Sarah Wilson.
Women and children's hospital.—Miss Cruddas.

On outbreak of war I took over the town hospital, but at first the administration was not satisfactory, on account of want of supervision over expenses of stores, and sanitation. Therefore appointed an issuer and storekeeper, and a sanitary inspector. To existing accommodation I added a native ward, nurses' quarters, a ward for Out Patients, and milk tins for use as hand grenades, with slow match fuzes, with complete success, by Lieut. Feltham. Sergeant Page, champion bait thrower of Port Elizabeth, by using a whip stick and short line, was able to throw these with accuracy over a distance of 100 yards.

Fuel.—When coal and wood began to run low, a very satisfactory fuel was made up of coal dust and cow dung mixed.

Fuzes.—A simple and useful percussion fuze was invented by Lieutenant Daniel, British South Africa Police, in which the butt end of a Lee-Metford cartridge was used as detonator. This fuze was in regular use with our locally made and supplied rounds.

Howitzer.—A 6-inch howitzer was made in our workshops, under the orders of Major Panzer, by Mr. Conolly. The bore was a tube of steel, with iron rings shrunk on in two tiers. The breech was a block of cast bronze. The trunnions and ring were a similar solid casting. The gun threw a 18-lb. ball (shell), and reached a distance of 4,000 yards.

Lookout poles.—Telescopic look-out poles were made of lengths of iron piping, and set up with steel wire stays, with a pulley and sling seat to hoist the man to the masthead. Height, about 15 feet.

Railway.—The defences railway, 1½ miles long, was laid for working gangs on the defences. Also a large amount of rolling stock.

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Natives.—(Under Mr. Bell, Resident Magistrate and Colonial Commissioner.)

Natives in Mafeking, during the siege, were—

Baralongs, 5,000.
Fingoes, Shangans, and district Baralongs, 2,000.
Total, between 7,000 and 8,000.

The Shangans were refugees from the Johannesburg mines, and were sent into Mafeking by the Boers on the outbreak of war. Being accustomed to digging, they proved useful for working gangs on the defences. The district Baralongs, Fingoes, and Cape Boys, came into Mafeking when their villages were burnt, and their cattle looted by the Boers. From among them we got about 300 men to act as armed cattle guards, watchmen, police, &c.

The local Baralongs living in the Stadt displayed their loyalty, and did some good service (especially after I had deposed their Chief Saani). They were—

Bathoen was loyal, but too timid to be of use.
Hatsiokomo and Matuba (British sub-
police, &c.
Men fought with them.

Copane, a subject of the Boers, although forced to supply them with men, offered us his allegiance.

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Of the natives living in the district, Saani remained particularly loyal, and although a prisoner in the hands of the Boers, he managed to send us information from time to time. Bathoen was loyal, but too timid to be of use.
Copane, a subject of the Boers, although forced to supply them with men, offered us his allegiance.
Hatsiokomo and Matuba (British subjects), joined the enemy, and the latter and his men fought with them.

Resident Engineer.

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Railway.—

(Under Captain More.)

132 men, 46 women, 86 children.
Eighteen locomotives, only one of which was damaged by shell fire, as they were moved round to the "lee" side of the railway buildings with every move of the enemy's big gun.

Also a large amount of rolling stock.

Value of railway plant, £120,000.

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Hatsiokomo and Matuba (British subjects), joined the enemy, and the latter and his men fought with them.

Railway.—

(Under Captain More.)

132 men, 46 women, 86 children.
Eighteen locomotives, only one of which was damaged by shell fire, as they were moved round to the "lee" side of the railway buildings with every move of the enemy's big gun.

Also a large amount of rolling stock.

Value of railway plant, £120,000.

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shot through ordinary loopholes at short distances, especially in trench work, I devised a form of steel loophole with two plates of ½-inch steel bolted together at an angle of 45 degrees, with a hole 2 inches square in the middle of the joint, the shield being 2 feet high and 2 feet wide.

Steel sap roller.—I also had a sapping shield made of two sheets of ½-inch steel, each 4 feet square, bolted together at an angle and mounted on wheels, to be pushed in front of a party pushing a sap under fire.

**Relief Committee.**

**Numbers of the Refugees and some of the townpeople, being without means during the siege, I formed a relief committee, consisting of the Mayor, the Base Commandant, the Chaplain, and other representative men, with myself as president, for disbursing funds for purchase of clothing and necessaries, &c., and for the issue of rations to deserving cases.**

Sums received from the various relief funds, were thus carefully and advantageously administered and accounted for, and there was no real suffering among the white population.

**Staff.**

**Head-quarters—**

Colonel Commanding—Colonel Baden-Powell.
Chief Staff Officer—Major Lord E. Cecil, D.S.O.
Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General (B)—Captain Ryan, Army Service Corps.
Aide-de-Camp—Captain G. Wilson, Royal Horse Guards.
Intelligence Officer—Lieutenant Hon. A. Hanbury-Tracy, Royal Horse Guards.
Local—

Commanding Artillery and Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General—Major Panzera, British South Africa Police.
Base Commandant and Commanding Engineer—Major C. B. Vyvyan, "Bufta."
Principal Medical Officer—Dr. W. Hayes (at first), Major Anderson, Royal Army Medical Corps.
Chief Paymaster—Captain Greener, British South Africa Police.
Town Commandant and Protectorate Native—Major C. G. H. Bell, Resident Magistrate and Civil Commissioner.
Women and children—Mr. F. Whiteley, Mayor.
Transport—Lieutenant McKenzie.
Post and Telegraphs—Mr. Howat, Postmaster.
Chaplains—Rev. W. H. Weekes (Church of England), Rev. Father Ogle (Roman Catholic).

**Spies.**

The enemy were well informed of all that went on in Mafeking during the siege. We had over 50 suspects in the mode for the greater part of the time, but it was almost impossible to get proofs against them. The stationmaster had undoubtedly been in communication with an ex-Fenian, Whelan, a prominent member of the Irish Land League. This man we arrested on the outbreak of war, and kept in gaol. He had among his papers a code for messages. The natives acted as spies for the enemy; we caught two and tried them, and shot them.

**More than half the families in the women's laager were Dutch, and of pro-Boer sympathies. Four of our men deserted to the enemy at different times.**

**Transport.**

(Under Lieutenant McKenzie).

This department was very ably managed, and, though at first much hired transport was employed, Lieutenant McKenzie gradually arranged so that the whole of the Army Service Corps, Royal Engineers, sanitary, &c., duties (as well as the regimental work) were carried out by the Government transport available, viz.—

- 11 wagons.
- 6 Scotch carts.
- 2 trollies.
- 3 ambulances.
- 186 mules.
- 12 oxen.

The men kept their condition wonderfully well, considering the absence of forage and the amount of work.

**Water Supply.**

(Under Major Vyvyan and Major Hepworth.)

The enemy cut off our water supply from the waterworks during the first few days of the siege. Fortunately the season was unusually wet, and consequently the Molopo stream did not run dry, and house tanks kept fairly filled. But to make sure against contingencies, and to ensure a supply of wholesome water, we cleaned out various wells and dug a new one of great capacity.

The water from these was issued to the town and garrison by means of tank wagons, filled nightly and posted at convenient points during the day.

**Women's Laager.**

(Under Mr. P. Whiteley, the Mayor.)

Forced at Mr. Rowland's house, where everything was placed at the disposal of the refugees in a most kindly way by Mr. Rowlands.

Number of whites—10 men, 188 women, 315 children; also about 150 native servant girls.

Health fairly good considering the circumstances. Diphtheria made its appearance, but after four cases was stopped by isolation.

Deaths, 24.

A large bombproof, 180 yards by 5 feet, was made for the accommodation of the whole of the inhabitants of the laager, with protected walls, latrines, &c. The women and children were rationed, the supply and distribution being efficiently carried out by Mr. Whiteley, without any kind of renumeration to himself.

This gentleman carried out the entire management of the laager with conspicuous success, and was very ably assisted by Rev. W. H. Weekes and Mr. Rowlands.

The following were the cases dealt with by the Court of Summary Jurisdiction:

- House-breaking, 14.
- Treason, 35.
- Theft, 197.
- Minor offences, 184.
- Total, 430.

**Punishments.**

- Death, 5.
- Corporal punishment, 115.
- Detention in gaol, 23.
- Fines, 57.
- Imprisonment with hard labour, 91.
- Total 291.
- Total fines, 14fl. 3s. 6d.

**III.—Engagements during the Siege.**

**Action of 14th October.**

Six miles north of Mafeking on railway.

Early in the morning of the 14th October...
our reconnoitring patrols exchanged shots with a strong party of the enemy, who were advancing along the railway 3 miles north of the town.

I ordered out the armoured train, under Captain Williams, British South Africa Police, to endeavour to rush the Boers and pour a heavy fire into them, as I wanted to make the first blow felt by them to be a very hard one. The train carried a 1-pounder Hotchkiss and a 303-inch Maxim, and 15 men, British South Africa Police.

I sent out, in support of the train, a squadron of the Protectorate Regiment, under Captain FitzClarence.

On coming up with the train he found it hurriedly engaged with the Boers, who had been strongly reinforced from their laager, some 7 miles north; they had also brought up a 7-pounder Krupp and a 1-pounder Maxim.

Captain FitzClarence, dismounting his men, advanced to attack with his left protected by the train.

He fired a round of an hour he was held by the enemy under a very hot fire, and then, pressing forward, well backed up by the train, he drove the enemy back and successfully beat off their several attempts to encircle his flank. Meanwhile, I sent out an additional troop under Lord Charles Bentinck, and also a 7-pr. These also became engaged and did good work. The fire from the armoured train put the enemy's gun out of action before it had fired a shot, and eventually also drove the 1-pr. Maxim from the field.

The engagement lasted about 4 hours, and the enemy largely outnumbered our men, but Captain FitzClarence made up for this deficiency by the handling of his men. Moreover, he kept his orders in mind, and when he saw the opportunity he got he withdrew on to the train, and after driving the enemy back withdrew his command quietly on Masfeking, covered by the train, without any attempt on the part of the enemy to follow him up.

In this, their first engagement, the Protectorate Regiment showed a spirit and dash worthy of highly-trained troops, and were most ably led by Captain FitzClarence and Lord C. Bentinck.

This smartly fought little engagement had a great and lasting moral effect on the enemy.

Our casualties were—
- 2 killed.
- 16 wounded (including two Officers).
- 1 horse killed (cyclist).
- 4 horses killed.
- 12 wounded.

Enemy's Attack on the Stadt, 26th October, 1899.

Enemy commenced shelling at 6.30 a.m. till midday from the east and south with 7 guns. At noon they commenced a general advance against the town from the south-west, east, and north-east; the south-west being the main attack directed against the Stadt. Their number about 3,000. The enemy commenced firing at extreme range, to which we made no reply, reserving our fire for close distances. So soon as our volleys and Maxims commenced the enemy ceased their fire and soon began to withdraw at all points. Casualties on our side were one man wounded, and two horses and eight mules wounded; the Boers' losses unknown, but probably considerable, as their ambulances were on the field picking up for over an hour after the engagement.

It was afterwards (10th December) ascertained that the attack on the Stadt was intended as a feint, while the main attack should come off to northward, on our western face. The Boers had expected the Baralong not to fire on them sufficiently openly that they would otherwise have done; nor had they expected to find white men defending the Stadt. Their loss was, therefore, pretty heavy, and, surprised at their rebuff, they fell back altogether.

At one period of the action, a small mounted troop of Boers advanced at a gallop towards the western position, and came under fire of the Cape Police Maxim, which dropped five of them; the remainder rapidly dispersed.

During the afternoon some of our scouts near the Brickfields were moving, under fire, when one of them fell with his horse and lay stunned. Two Cape Police troopers in the works ran out and placed the injured man on his horse, and brought him in under heavy fire from the enemy: names, Troopers George Collins and W. F. Green.

Night Attack on Boer Trenches. 27th October, 1899.

During past two days enemy had improved their advanced trenches on the north-east face. I determined to make an attack on their main advanced trench with the bayonet, in order to discourage their advancing further.

A night attack was therefore organized with Captain FitzClarence's squadron, Protectorate Regiment, supported by a party of Cape Police.

Guiding lights were hoisted, by which Captain FitzClarence was able to lead his party past the flank of the main trench.

The attacking force moved off 9.30 p.m. in silence, with magazines charged, but no cartridges in the chamber, the order being to use the bayonet only. The men wore white armlets and used "FitzClarence" as their pass word. The night was dark, but still. The squadron attained its position on the left rear of enemy's trench without being challenged or fired at. Captain FitzClarence then wheeled up his men, and with a cheer charged into the main and a subsidiary trench, and cleared both with the bayonet.

The enemy's rearward trenches opened a heavy fire, to which the Cape Police replied from a flank, in order to draw the fire on to themselves, and so to allow Captain FitzClarence's squadron to return unmolested.

The whole operation was carried out exactly in accordance with instructions, and was a complete success, the more so as the enemy being taken by surprise, were in much confusion, and, as we afterwards discovered, fired into each other. Their casualties, we heard on reliable authority, amounted to 40 killed and wounded with the bayonet, 60 killed and wounded by rifle fire. Our casualties were six killed, nine wounded, two missing.

4233 Corporal Burt, 17th Lancers.
442 Trooper Josiah Soundy, Protectorate Regiment.
443 Trooper Charles Mayfield Middleditch, Protectorate Regiment.
171 Trooper Thomas Fraser.
292 Alexander Henry Turner.

Wounded.

Captain FitzClarence, slightly.
Action at Cannon Kopje. 31st October, 1899.

The enemy opened a heavy, concentrated shell fire from the south-eastern heights, from the racecourse (east), and from Jackal's Tree (south-west), directed against Cannon Kopje. The fire was well aimed, and the racecourse gun took the work in reverse. For a time little harm was done beyond knocking down parts of the parapet and smashing the iron supports of the lookout tower: most of the garrison were lying in the trenches some 80 yards in rear of the fort. The gun and two Maxim in the work had been previously dismounted and stowed away for safety during shell fire, to which, of course, they were powerless to reply. The telephone wire was cut away early in the proceedings. After half an hour's steady and accurate artillery fire, the enemy, who had been gradually massing on the high ground south and south-east of the fort, began to advance in line of skirmishers from three sides at once; they were backed up by other parties in support. A large force also collected in the Molopo Valley, south-east of the town, and were formed evidently with the idea of storming the town after Cannon Kopje had been captured.

As the enemy began to get within range of the fort, the garrison moved up from their cover of houses near south corner of the town, and were formed evidently with the idea of storming the town after Cannon Kopje had been captured.

At 2.30 A.M. Major Godley paraded his force, in accordance with a plan I had arranged, to attack the western camp of the enemy with a heavy fire at daylight, and then to retire again before enemy's guns and reinforcements arrived on the scene. The force in enemy's camp was reckoned at 200 to 250. Our force consisted of:

Two 7-pounders.
One 1-pounder Hotchkiss, under Major Pauza.
One squadron of 60 men, Protectorate Regiment, dismounted, under Captain Vernon.
One troop of 30 men, Bechuanaland Rifles mounted, under Captain Cowan.

The force moved out along the heights to about 1,500 yards in advance of Major Godley's position; Captain Vernon's squadron leading in attack order, with the guns on his left rear, and Bechuanaland Rifles covering his right rear.

At 4.15 A.M., our guns opened on enemy at 1,800 yards, and the squadron retreated to alternate into the enemy's camp, over which they had full command from the heights they were on. The surprise was complete, the enemy bolting in all directions to take cover. Their 1-pounder Maxim and 7-pounder Krupp in the Beacons Fort in a short time responded with a heavy and well-directed fire. Large bodies of reinforcements very soon began to come down from the main south-west laager. Major Godley thereupon commenced withdrawing his forces, artillery retiring first; the Bechuanaland Rifles occupying Fort Ayr to cover the retirement, which they did very effectively against a wing of mounted Boers who had worked round to our right flank. The enemy brought a very heavy musketry fire to bear on our force, but the retirement was carried out with the greatest steadiness. Enemy's strength about 800 or 1,000. Our retirement was further covered by 7-pounder at the west end of the Stadt, and the Cape Police Maxim and escort. In the course of the retirement, the 1-pounder Hotchkiss upset and broke the limber hook; her crew, Gunners R. Cowan and H. Godson, very pluckily stood up and repaired
damage with rope, &c., and got the gun away
safely under heavy fire from enemy's 1-pounder
Maxim and 7-pounder Krupp and rifle fire.

Three of enemy's ambulances were seen picking
up into three parties, and as it got light we
were able to further separate these from each
other, and to surround and attack them in
detail. The first party surrendered, the second
were driven out with loss by three squadrons
Protectorate Regiment, under Major Godfrey*,
and the third, in the British South African
Police fort, after a vain attempt to break out in
the evening, surrendered. During the whole of
the day, while the struggle was going on in the
Stadt, the enemy outside made demonstrations
as if about to attack, and kept up a hot shell
fire on the place, but without palpable effect.

We captured this day 108 prisoners, among
whom was Commandant Eloff, Kruger's grand-
son. We also found 10 killed and 19 wounded
Boers, and their ambulance picked up 30 more
killed and wounded. Our losses were four
killed, 10 wounded.

Our men, although weak with want of food
and exercise, worked with splendid pluck and
energy for the 14 hours of fighting, and
instances of gallantry in action were very
numerous.

Relief of Mafeking.
16th—17th May, 1900.

When relief became imminent, I formed a small
force of 180 men and two guns, under Colonel
Walford, capable of taking the field should it
be desirable to make a diversion or counter-
attack during the probable encounter between
the investing force and the relieving column.

On the evening of the 16th May, the enemy
contested the advance of the relief column
6 miles west of the place. Colonel Walford's
party moved out and demonstrated as if to
attack the Boers in rear. This caused them to
withdraw a 1-pr. Maxim which had been posted
on the probable line of advance of the relief
force and also a number of men with it. This move
left the road open for Colonel Mahon's force to
come into Mafeking, which it did during the
night without the knowledge of the Boers.

Early next morning, seeing that the enemy
were beginning to move wagons from the
lager, I pushed forward Colonel Walford's
force at once to attack, ordering the relief force
to join in as soon as possible. This had a good
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The operations connected with the relief of
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<td>Lieutenant Paton</td>
<td>Protectorate Regiment</td>
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<td>Captain FitaClarence</td>
<td>Bechuanaland Rifles</td>
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<td>22 men wounded</td>
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them, and disconcerted their plans. And again, after the fight outside Mafeking, when he bivouacked his column at nightfall, the Boers were prepared to renew the attack in the morning, only to find that he had slipped into the place during the night, and was through the town and shelling their laager on the other side.

The whole operation of the two relief columns was exceedingly well conceived and carried out. IV.—Recommendation of Officers and Others.

1. Staff.
2. Regimental.
3. Civil.

1. Staff.—Military.

Major Lord Edward Cecil, D.S.O., as Chief Staff Officer, was of the greatest assistance to me. He stuck pluckily to his work, although much hampered by sickness during the first part of the siege. He did a great amount of hard work in the first organization of the frontier force, and at Mafeking, his tact and unruffled temperament enabled our staff dealings with contractors and merchants to be carried on with the least possible friction.

Captain Ryan, Army Service Corps, as Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General (B), proved an exceptionally capable and energetic Supply Officer. On his shoulders fell the whole work of feeding the entire community, garrison, non-combatants, and native, a duty which he carried out with conspicuous success (practically unassisted), as we took the food supply out of the hands of contractors and merchants; and he lost the services of his two chief assistants, Captain Girdwood, killed, and Sergeant-Major Loney, convicted of theft of Government stores. Captain Ryan’s work has been invaluable, and his untiring zeal and self-devotion throughout the siege contributed to the successful issue of the siege.

Lieutenant Honourable A. Hanbury-Tracy, Royal Horse Guards, as Intelligence Officer and Press Censor, has worked hard and successfully, and with tact and firmness in his dealings with the Press correspondents.

Major Lord Edward Cecil, D.S.O., as Chief Paymaster, rendered largely due to their unremitting devotion and skill that the wounded, in so many cases, made marvellous recoveries, and the health of the garrison remained so good even in their own hospital.

Captain Greener, Paymaster, British South Africa Police, as Chief Paymaster, rendered most efficient and valuable service throughout the siege. He kept account of all Government expenditures and receipts connected with defence, feeding population, &c., in addition to his ordinary paymaster and administrative capabilities rendered his service of highest value. By his care and zeal I am convinced that the Government were saved much expense.

2. Regimental.

Lieutenant-Colonel Hore, Staffordshire Regiment, raised, organized, and commanded the Protectorate Regiment, which did invaluable service in the siege.

Major Godley, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, as Adjutant of the Protectorate Regiment, had much to do with the successful organisation of the corps when it was first raised. As commander of the western defences of Mafeking throughout the siege his services were of the highest value. His coolness, readiness of resource, and skill in dealing with the Colonials made him an ideal Officer for such command in action.

He was my right hand in the defence. I cannot speak too highly of his good work.

Colonel Walford, British South Africa Police, commanded the southern defences, with his detachment of British South Africa Police, throughout the siege with conspicuous success. Always cool and quick to see what was wanted, his services were most valuable.

Inspector Browne, Cape Police, commanded the detachment of Division 2, Cape Police. He and the splendid lot of men under his command did excellent work throughout the siege, especially in the occupation of the trenches in the first instance. To his uniriting zeal and ability the successful defence of the town is largely due. He carried out a very heavy amount of work, practically single-handed, and with conspicuous success.

Major Anderson, Royal Army Medical Corps, throughout the siege showed uniriting zeal, coupled with coolness and gallantry, in attending the wounded under fire in action, in addition to his eminent professional ability. Latterly, as Principal Medical Officer, his unfailing tact and administrative capabilities rendered his services of highest value. The strain of his devotion to his duty told heavily on his health.

Medical Staff.—Dr. W. Hayes, Surgeon-Major Holmde, British South Africa Police, and Dr. T. Hayes, all worked with conspicuous zeal and skill under a never-ending strain of work; all of them very frequently under fire in carrying out their duties, even in their own hospital.

Nursing Staff.—The work done by the lady nurses was beyond all praise.

Miss Hill, the Matron of the Victoria Hospital, was assisted by a number of lady volunteers, in addition to her regular staff, consisting of Mrs. Parmister and Miss Gamble.

Mother Superior Touroussa, and eight Sisters of Mercy also worked in the hospital.

Lady Sarah Wilson, assisted by other ladies, managed the Convalescent Hospital.

The above ladies worked with the greatest zeal and self-sacrifice throughout the siege. He kept account of all Government expenditures and receipts connected with defence, feeding population, &c., in addition to his ordinary paymaster and administrative duties. By his care and zeal I am convinced that the Government were saved much expense.

Under-Colonel Bide, British South Africa Police, as Chief Paymaster, rendered most efficient and valuable service throughout the siege. He kept account of all Government expenditures and receipts connected with defence, feeding population, &c., in addition to his ordinary paymaster and administrative duties. By his care and zeal I am convinced that the Government were saved much expense.

Captain Greener, Paymaster, British South Africa Police, as Chief Paymaster, rendered most efficient and valuable service throughout the siege. He kept account of all Government expenditures and receipts connected with defence, feeding population, &c., in addition to his ordinary paymaster and administrative duties. By his care and zeal I am convinced that the Government were saved much expense.
Brickfields, where for over a month they were within close range of the enemy's works, and constantly on the alert and under fire.

Inspector Marsh, Cape Police, Division 1, commanded the detachment of Division 1 throughout the siege, and carried out his duties most efficiently and zealously.

Captain Cowan, commanding the Bechuanaland Rifles (Volunteers), had his corps in such a condition of efficiency as to do a great measure of service to the citizens and to the Town Guard. He commanded the Home Guard. He managed their rationing, hospital, and defence works, protection for their women and children, &c., in a most practical manner. His energy and resourcefulness were conspicuous throughout the siege. The armoured trains, defence railway, search light, &c., were made under his order.

Captain March, Royal West Kent Regiment, commanded a squadron of the Protectorate Regiment, with very good results. He also had charge of the defence of the native Stadt, and displayed great tact and patience in his successful management of the natives.

Captain Vernon, King's Royal Rifle Corps, commanded a squadron of the Protectorate Regiment, with very good results. He also commanded a squadron of the South African Rifles, and displayed the greatest gallantry in action. He was killed in action on 26th December.

Captain FitzClarence, Royal Fusiliers, commanded a squadron in the Protectorate Regiment, with very good results. He also took up, at my request, the difficult task of arranging for the feeding and housing of all the women and children, and carried out their management with marked success throughout the siege, devoting himself to the task without any return whatever.

He was much assisted by Mr. Rowsland, who gave up his house, garden, water supply, &c., to be used by the laager, similarly without drawing any kind of compensation or return.

The Rev. Mr. W. H. Weekes also rendered valuable service in assisting in the management of the women's laager, &c.

Mr. Howat, Post and Telegraph Master, with his staff, did a most public-spirited and valuable work in connecting up, and in keeping in communication with head-quarters the whole of the defence works by telephone. Their duties were unceasing, by night as well as by day, and were frequently carried out under heavy fire and at great personal risk. The zeal, energy, and willingness displayed by these officers was most conspicuous throughout the siege, and their work had a large share in bringing about the successful issue of the siege.

Mr. Heal, the jailer, carried out most arduous and difficult duties most loyally and efficiently. In addition to ordinary prisoners, he had in charge military offenders, and also a large number of Dutch suspects, spies, and Irish traitors. He was unfortunately killed by a shell, 12th May, at his post in the jail.

Serjeant Slower, Cape Police, rendered valuable service as head of the civil police during the siege.

Mr. Millar, head of the refugees' laager, displayed much zeal and did excellent work in the management of the refugees' laager and defences, &c.


Trooper (local Serjeant-Major) Hodgson, Cape Police, was appointed as Serjeant-Major to the Army Service Corps, and was of the greatest help to Captain Ryan. He proved himself to be a most thoroughly reliable, sober, and upright man, clever at his work, and particularly active and zealous in his performance.

Serjeant Cook, Bechuanaland Rifles, specially recommended for clever and plucky scouting, and for gallantry in action (vide separate letter).

Serjeant-Major Moffat, Signalling Staff, for...
The gallantry in action, in bringing a sergeant out of action under heavy fire. Also for good work as a signaller (side separate letter).

Sergeant-Major Taylor, Colonial Contingent, for gallantry and general good work in the Bekoldfield, scouting, blowing up a kiln occupied by the enemy, &c.

This non-commissioned officer was killed in action.

Conclusion.

I should like to add that the conduct of the rank and file of the garrisons throughout the 31 weeks' siege, was beyond all praise. In all the long strain of privations, due to short rations and to the entire absence of all luxuries, as well as to living in trenches month after month, there was no complaining, and the men took their hardships smiling. When there was fighting to be done they showed unexceptionable pluck and steadfastness.

The Town Guard, formed of all the civilians capable of bearing arms, took to their duties as soldiers, and submitted themselves to military discipline with most praiseworthy readiness and success.

The self-devotion and good work of the ladies who acted as nurses in the hospitals, have already been alluded to, but the bravery and patience of all the women and elder children, under all the cruel dangers, anxieties, and privations to which they were exposed, were most exemplary.

The natives took their share in the defence of their Stadt, and showed great patience under their trials.

The notable feature of the siege was that the whole community was pervaded by a spirit of loyal endurance and cheery good feeling, under which all the usual local and private differences were sunk in the one great idea of maintaining Her Majesty's supremacy to the end. With such spirit to work on, the task of conducting the defence was an easy one.

R. S. S. Baden-Powell.

From Major-General Baden-Powell, Commanding North-West Frontier Forces, to the Chief Staff Officer to Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, V.C.

Sun., Oudhhoop, 6th June, 1900.

With reference to the recommendations of Officers for good service in the siege of Mafeking, as submitted in my report on the operations, I venture to recommend for special recognition the following from among those Officers:—

Major Godley.
Major Vyvyan.
Captain Ryan.
Major Lord E. Cecil.
Lieutenant-Colonel Walford.
Major Pansera.

All of whom did exceptionally good service.

Captain Fittoflorences, for personal gallantry, recommended for the V.C.

Captain Marsh, good service in action.

Captain Ashley-Williams, good service in action.

Lieutenant Lord C. Beattie, good service in action.

Major Anderson, medical services.

Major Gould-Adams, civil and political services.

Mr. C. C. H. Bell, civil and political services.

Mr. F. Whiteley (Mayor of Mafeking), eminent civil services. His reward would be highly appreciated by the townpeople, as recognition of their share in the defence.